Authoritarian populists almost doubled their share of voting rights in Europe between 2001 and 2018 – from 11.8% to 22.3%, according to the Swedish think tank. Timbro institut. It was then a decline after, but it is too early to say whether it represents a permanent turnaround. In any case, the rise in itself has been too great to overlook.
While all populist politicians contrast “the people” with “the corrupt elite” – both nationally and internationally, not all populists are authoritarian populists. They do not all seek to destroy the rule of law or argue that, since they represent the majority, they should not be restricted by laws that protect the rights of minorities.
In my research for a future work, I have aimed to explore what helps populists come to power in different European countries. The case of post-communist nations such as Hungary and Poland is particularly interesting. Both have voted for populist parties with an authoritarian leaning to power – and their decisions cannot be explained solely by economic factors.
Economic uncertainty drives people vote for populist parties.. In my research, I have seen that the configuration of high unemployment and income disparity creates a fertile breeding ground for populist parties. They are not enough to open the door for them alone, but where high unemployment and inequality are combined with either a relatively low level of public expenditure (which does not compensate for the social impact of unemployment and inequality) or with low median per capita income (which exacerbates the effects of these poor socio-economic conditions), populism is often flourishing. There are four southern European countries that fit well in this pattern – Greece (with its Syriza party), Italy (Lega Nord on the right and the Five Star Movement on the left), Portugal (Bloco de Esquerda) and Spain (Vox on the right and Podemos on the left ).
These parties have had relative success periods over the past decade and several of them have made it to government. But no one has made significant maneuvers to undermine democracy itself, for example by attacking the judiciary or pissing off constitutions. However, this has happened in Hungary and Poland.
Another way
In Hungary and Poland, the result of the populist increase is stronger and more clearly authoritarian. And the path to populist power seems to be different than in southern Europe. Both countries fit somewhat into the economic pattern in that their median income is below the European average. Yet their income gap is in the middle range. It is also public spending.
Here, the communist past of these nations can be a factor in more ways than one. Populists seek unity and claim a monopoly over representing the “people”. Societies with many strong autonomous organizations, with many ways for people to organize themselves around their interests and ideas, are more difficult to shape into new mass movements. In such pluralistic societies, rich in “social fabric”, it is more difficult for populists to gain broad support. Communist societies were organized by a single party nationwide. This tradition suits the populist projects very well so nations that still come from a communist heritage are a fertile ground.
To this communist past is added the rapid cultural change of the present age. This can be disgusting for some people who have conservative values, especially in the Catholic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Here also plays a tradition that is much older than communism. Voters may stop supporting politicians who promise to restore traditional values. In Hungary, President Viktor Orban uses and abuses religion to divide people – especially through anti-Semitism. In Poland, it is more of a two-way relationship. The Law and Justice of the Populist Party, led by Jarosลaw Kaczyลski, rules in coalition with Poland’s Solidarity and benefits from the support of the media empire of the Catholic priest Tadeusz Rydzyk, who is able to put pressure on the government on issues that are important to the church, e.g. abortion..
Catholic tradition alone is not enough to generate support for authoritarian populism. It is hardly a problem in Ireland or Malta. But the nature of Catholicism differs in different countries. For example, Maltese and Polish societies may be characterized by similar values โโof social conservatism, yet they may differ in their views on political order.
During the second half of the 20th century, Western Catholicism brought about a change in response to the tragedy of World War II and the suffering caused by totalitarian regimes. It became much more appreciative of democracy. But in countries living under the Soviet-type regime, Catholicism had less chance of developing in that direction.
Probably the most interesting part of this story is that the communist system had an impact on local churches, even though they opposed communism. Compared to countries outside the Soviet quarter, these churches remained very hierarchical, which helped to cultivate distrust of the outside world.
There is no single way to explain the rise of authoritarian populism throughout Europe. The same result can have more than one cause. It seems that the economic factors help to explain the increased support for populist parties in southern Europe, but they are not sufficient to explain the rise of populism in Hungary and Poland. When thinking about why, it is worth considering that not only interests but ideas matter. When Catholicism became entangled with communism, it seems to have created a mixture that enabled authoritarian populists to come to power.
Author: Tomasz Mickiewicz – 50th Anniversary Professor of Economics, Aston University
Source: sn.dk