However, the lack of public debate on this important measure is worrying, especially with regard to the nuclear dimension. Finland has long been a member of the European Union alongside Sweden, but has so far refused to join NATO. Why? The answer is the same as the question of why NATO and the US have refused to intervene directly in Ukraine: fear of opposing a major nuclear power, namely Russia.
This problem will not go away, even if Finland does join NATO. In fact, it is important to consider how the effects of NATO membership affect Finland’s security in the nuclear world. Finland’s 1,340-kilometer border with Russia means that NATO will find a new and by far the longest land border between East and West overnight. When applying to join NATO, the people seek quick access, without negotiating or securing preliminary agreements on how border security logistics would be handled or which weapon systems could be located in Finland. Prime Minister Marin has stated that NATO has no interest in “setting up nuclear weapons or bases in Finland”, but there can be no guarantee that Brussels and Washington will agree – or even if they do, they will not change their minds later. In other words, Finland may be at the forefront of nuclear power in a geopolitical conflict with its large neighbor. How can this affect Finland’s security?
The answers may be found in Russia’s evolving nuclear and declaration policy. Russia announced strategic lessons / 2010, 2014 and 2020 emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons for intimidation in defense of themselves and their allies and in the context of an existential threat to state sovereignty. Some of these threats may be non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction or threats to nuclear resources. There are still questions about the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional weapons failure. U.S. strategists have referred to this escalation as descalation, as a policy of shocking opponents to withdraw from military targets for fear that escalation will continue.
Russia understands that its security concerns stem from NATO enlargement. We can discuss whether these concerns are justified or not, but there can be no doubt that Moscow thinks so. Why? First, NATO’s regional expansion after the Cold War placed strategic bases with U.S. missile defense in Russia’s proximity to Poland, Romania, and offshore targets. Second, given the U.S. offer of full military dominance in all threatening theaters and its continued attempts to overcome the second strike of Russia’s retaliation, Moscow faces a real strategic vulnerability. With the rise of Finland, the US missile defense systems could be even closer to Russia’s homeland, which increases Russia’s fear of a deep strategic vulnerability. This is a dangerous step against a powerful nuclear power.
When the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation maintained a “no first use” setup until 1993, the United States has been fighting the nuclear war at least since the 1980s, dedicated to forced negotiations, escalation, and a flexible response. It developed limited nuclear power options in the late 1960s. Because it did not have the usual military capabilities in Europe during the Cold War, it relied on an extended policy of intimidation to defend its allies with a threatened nuclear attack if a conventional attack on NATO countries. The United States sees the threat of a nuclear attack as a negotiating tool and maintains the credibility of the threats by putting the risk of escalation at random. It currently comprises the position “computational ambiguity“Without red lines to maintain complete freedom in conflict situations.
Thus, whether or not Finns recognize the geopolitical consequences of joining NATO, their country moves from non-aligned nuclear disarmament to a state where the non-democratic military alliance decides how their border security works and which weapons systems. are in use in their state. How the conflict in Ukraine now ends diplomatic solutions give way and western military targets are growing? It can be a protracted conflict that doesn’t spread much beyond those boundaries and doesn’t expand into larger arenas. However, the war is already challenging Europe’s economic prosperity and global supply chains with extensive economic sanctions against Russia and setbacks in Ukrainian agriculture. Although the West is confident Russia’s moral violation, many countries either supported Russia (including China) or abstained in a recent UN vote. Many of these states may speculate that the Russian and Chinese sides have protection from U.S. and Western dominance.
We do not question for a moment why Finland sees NATO’s events as the best way to secure its security. Nor do we in any way justify Russia’s cruel and incompetent attack. But geography matters. Finland’s long border with Russia puts it at the forefront of future nuclear research between East and West. This would be one thing if the United States had adopted a defensive, non-first-use deterrent policy; instead, its quest for nuclear power creates genuine fear in Moscow and increases the possibility of war. The promised benefit of Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO was that the Nordic countries were able to influence the Alliance’s overall policy. However, with the rise of one night, one wonders whether Finland has already given up this opportunity to influence.
Factor: SM AmadaeUniversity of Helsinki and Campbell CraigUniversity of Cardiff
This is the “View” column. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of The Helsinki Times. This column has not been revised and HT is not responsible for any inaccurate or misleading statements in this article.
Source: The Nordic Page